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Abstract 
One approach to identifying policy change stresses policy instruments, settings and policy 
paradigms (Hall 1993), while another also considers the process and culmination of various 
shifts and consequent outcomes (Streeck and Thelen 2005). This paper illustrates the debate 
through an examination of how far developments in social security policy between the 1997-
2010 New Labour and 2010-15 Coalition governments in the UK constituted real policy 
shifts.  It shows that, despite continuities in instruments and approach there have been 
substantial changes in the impact of welfare state policies related to short-term benefits, 
employment and housing. The paper identifies new policy directions leading to a different 
kind of welfare state concerned less with living standards and equality and more with 
individual responsibility and paid work. It suggests that this has been achieved without the 
need for radical changes in instruments and their settings. 
KEYWORDS: Social security, welfare policy, UK Coalition, Conservative Party, New 
Labour, policy change 
  
Introduction 
The UK has been characterized as the paradigmatic majoritarian democracy, allowing the 
party of government to exercise considerable authority over policy directions. In theory, a 
new government is in a strong position to redirect policy. The tendency of UK parties to offer 
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sharply contrasting characterisations of their policy approaches in their manifestoes, and the 
adversarial style of British party politics, certainly supports this impression.  
Few areas over the 2010 to 2015 period have been as hotly debated as the PDLQSDUWLHV¶
approaches to welfare policy. There is now good quality evidence of the different effects of 
WKHVHDSSURDFKHVDQGFOHDUVHWVRIµQHZ¶SROLFLHVFDQEHLGHQWLILHGIURPUHQGHULQJWKLV
a fruitful area in which to examine the extent of change under the Coalition. Yet, analyses of 
social security policy over the period from New Labour, in power since 1997, to the Coalition 
diverge significantly on the extent of ideological and policy change since 2010. In this paper 
we use the 1997 to 2015 period to illustrate debates over how and whether change occurs, in 
what circumstances, and how it can be identified and characterised. These matter for two 
reasons. 
Firstly, there is a practical implication. General elections represent the main point of political 
engagement for the vast majority of citizens in modern democracies. Understanding the 
capacity of such events to SURGXFHµUHDO¶FKDQJH, through a change of government or 
leadership, is important in understanding the capacities and limitations of party systems. 
Some strands of welfare state theory suggest that opportunities to achieve significant shifts in 
policy direction in majoritarian democracies are limited (Pierson 1994). These may focus on 
QRWLRQVRIµSDWKGHSHQGHQF\¶RUWKHµLQFUHDVLQJUHWurns and positive feedback that sustain and 
UHLQIRUFHLQVWLWXWLRQVWKURXJKWLPH¶6WUHHFNDQG7KHOHQ,QH[SODLQLQJZKHUH
observable shifts do or have occurred, some writers draw oQWKHLGHDRIµSXQFWXDWHG¶ path 
dependency (Krasner 1984). This approach suggests that change is driven by exogenous 
µVKRFNV¶, with long periods of stasis interspersed by periodic ruptures (Thelen 2004: 28-30). 
The possibility of agent-OHGFKDQJHLVWKHUHIRUHLQKLELWHGLQµVHWWOHG¶WLPHVZLWKWKHDELOLW\RI
actors to cultivate change realised largely in times of upheaval (Katznelson 2003).  
7KH8.¶VUHFHQWH[SHULHQFHFKDOOHQJHVWKLVunderstanding. Alongside many other countries, 
LWH[SHULHQFHGDODUJHH[RJHQRXVµVKRFN¶LQthe 2008 financial crisis. The pace of policy 
change in welfare has however remained slow, such that some analyses are reluctant to 
recognise it as change at all and instead identify broad continuity (Lister and Bennett 2010, 




2005: 3). Such analyses tend to proceed from a more or less-H[SOLFLWO\LGHQWLILHGµRUGHUVRI
FKDQJH¶DSSURDFK+DOOIRFXVLQJRQSROLF\LQVWUXPHQWVDQGVHWWLQJV and tend to be 
more common in political science analyses. The absence of third-RUGHUµSDUDGLJPDWLFVKLIWV¶
suggests that the capacity of the incoming Coalition to enact change was limited even in 
apparently conducive circumstances.  
This observation leads to the second important aspect of the debate on how, when and 
whether change occurs. Different analytical starting points lead to different conclusions. A 
more outcomes-based analysis suggests that significant change can occur without a definitive 
rupture or paradigm shift occurring: the CASE series of analyses offer the most 
comprehensive example of this (Hills, 2015a). They identify significant changes in 
approaches to welfare policy, particularly with respect to attitudes towards poverty and 
UHGLVWULEXWLRQZKLFKPD\KDYHPDMRULPSOLFDWLRQVIRUIXWXUHJRYHUQPHQWV¶SROLF\GLUHFWLRQV. 
The models of change deployed in the accounts outlined above appear to miss, or to be 
unable to account for, these significant shifts.  
In part, we suggest, this is because accounts focusing on policy structure lack sufficiently 
sophisticated tools ± examining processes and outcomes of change alongside intentions ± to 
fully understand the implications of gradual, iterative policy development. They therefore 
tend to understate the extent to which iterative change over a longer timespan (beyond an 
LGHQWLILDEOHµUXSWXUH¶, which may not be observable) can point towards a more radical policy 
shift overall.  
The value added by this paper is therefore to illustrate how minor policy shifts ± which would 
be understood as first or second-RUGHULQ+DOO¶VIUDPHZRUNFDQOHDGWRPDMRU± paradigmatic 
or transformative ± change. In doing so, we use, and illustrate the utility of frameworks that 
direct attention to outcomes and processes alongside policy intentions ± notably Streeck and 
7KHOHQ¶VµEH\RQGFRQWLQXLW\¶DSSURDFKIn focusing on the full range of working-age 
social security policy enacted by New Labour, the Coalition and the Conservatives, the paper 
additionally takes a different approach to much social policy analysis which has tended to 
focus on discrete areas, illustrating how seemingly small changes across a range of areas can 
cumulate to produce an overall transformation.  
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This paper therefore contributes to the XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIERWKµZKDWFRXQWV¶DVSROLF\FKDQJH
and of how governments achieve thisµ>FXOWLYDWLQJ@FKDQJHIURPZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRI
H[LVWLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGFRQVWUDLQWV¶6WUHHFNDQG7KHOHQ7KLVOHDGVWRZDUGV
UHODWHGFRQFHSWVRIµVWUDWHJLFDFWLRQ¶+D\RUµVLWXDWHGDJHQF\¶%HYLUDQG5KRGHV
2005), focusing on how actors negotiate and challenge constraints. Analysing the application 
of strategies in pursuit of change provides a means of bridging the gap between broad 
continuity in higher-level programme structure, and the details of these that engender change 
in ground-level outcomes. Both approaches are illustrated in existing analyses; in this paper, 
we attempt to address the disjuncture between their respective conclusions. The use of an 
alternative theoretical approach provides a different perspective on the extent and 
significance of reforms since 2010.  
The following section of the paper situates it within the current literature, in relation to 
analyses of change between New Labour and the Coalition. This discussion illustrates how 
the same sets of policies have been interpreted as displaying both continuity and change. We 
then outline 6WUHHFNDQG7KHOHQ¶VWKHRUHWLFDODSSURDFK and apply it as a means of challenging 
the dominant perspective in political science-based analyses of the New Labour/Coalition 
years, which tend to stress continuity. Overall, we suggest that while looking at current 
instruments highlights continuity, a focus on wider outcomes, and early stage developments 
under the Conservative government foregrounds change, re-asserting the capacity of parties 
to act in accordance with their ideological goals and to pursue divergent policy agendas. 
 
Interpretations of UK Welfare Reform 
Policy changes can be analysed along a number of dimensions. In this section we focus on 
two areas of analysis which have led to different accounts of the extent of change between 
New Labour and the Coalition: accounts based on policy structures and on policy outcomes.  
Policy structure-based accounts of the transition between New Labour and the Coalition have 
tended to emphasise continuity between the two administrations. This is in spite of the 




2011: 231). Such accounts juxtapose the rhetoric of innovation with the apparent tendency 
WRZDUGVµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶LQSROLF\PDNLQJThey represent a challenge to the identification 
of the UK system as an exemplar of majoritarian democracy (Lijphart 1999) in which 
governments have a relatively free hand in terms of policy-making. Instead such accounts 
VXJJHVWWKDW8.SROLF\SURFHVVHVµPD\EHEHVWVHHQ as consultative and non-UDGLFDO¶(Jordan 
and Cairney 2013: 240), with less change evident between governments than might be 
expected. 
Hence Lister and Bennett (2010) contend that Conservative welfare-to-work plans in the run-
up to the election GLGµQRWKLQJWREUHDNRXWRIWKHSROLF\SDUDGLJPHVWDEOLVKHGE\/DERXU¶
VLPSO\WDNLQJLWµIXUWKHUDQGIDVWHU¶0F.D\DQG5RZOLQJVRQVXJJHVWWKDWalthough changes in 
policy settings occurred as the new government took office, WKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VDSSURDFKµVHHms 
WREHDQLQWHQVLILFDWLRQRIH[LVWLQJSROLFLHVUDWKHUWKDQDQHZGLUHFWLRQ¶'HDFRQ
DQG3DWULFNVWDWHWKDWWKHLQFRPLQJSDUWLHVRIIHUHGµQRWFKDQJHEXWPRUHRIWKH
VDPH¶'ULYHULGHQWLILHs continuity around welfare-to-work and employment 
policies, meaning there was µlittle to divide government and opposition in the run-up to the 
JHQHUDOHOHFWLRQDQGEH\RQG¶ Patrick (2012) and Dwyer and Wright (2014) 
further identify continuity around concepts of social citizenship, including an emphasis on the 
responsibilities of citizens.  
Looking back on the Coalition, Page (2015: 69) suggests that New Labour failed to challenge 
the residualisation of social security that began under Thatcher, while the Conservatives 
subsequently downplayed their own social modernisation in government as it proved an 
uneasy fit with their (un-reconstructed) economic ideology (2015:70). Beech (2015: 265) 
reflects that on domestic policy, WKH&RDOLWLRQSUHVHQWHGµDPL[HGEDJRIUHIRUPZLWKERWK
continuities and discontinuities, rather than a transformative¶SROLWLFVHPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO 
The overall theme and direction, therefore, is a level of continuity. 
This is at odds with the policy positions and rhetoric of the Conservatives in opposition. The 
Conservative Social Justice Policy Group (2007), for example, developed an extensive 
FULWLTXHRI1HZ/DERXU¶VDSSURDFKWRZHOIDUH. This subsequently significantly influenced Iain 
'XQFDQ6PLWK¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHSROLF\DUHDDV6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHIRU:RUNDQG3HQVLRQVVHH
for example, Duncan Smith 2011a and 2012), with the Conservatives leading on welfare 
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policy development in government (McEnhill 2015). Certainly, the new government was 
perceived as having introduced a significant shift by some activist groups that campaigned 
YLJRURXVO\DJDLQVWWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VSROLF\DSSURDFKHV:LOOLDPV-Findlay, 2011). Yet, the 
analyses above suggest that this was a process that may have generated more heat than light.  
Figure 1 represents working age welfare policy in the UK since 1997. The policies are 
divided into sets representing disability and incapacity benefits, active labour market policies, 
low-income supplements and measures, housing benefit, child benefit, and the new µDXVWHULW\¶
policies introduced by the Coalition and Conservative governments. 
Figure 1: UK1 working-age welfare policy, 1997-2018 
Clearly, many over-arching policy structures do remain very similar across all three 
administrations7KHFOHDUHVWH[DPSOHVRIµFKDQJH¶ ± which were not available to those 
writing some of the analyses above ± are those enacted by the Coalition and extended in 
*HRUJH2VERUQH¶V(PHUJHQF\%XGJHW. 7KHVHDUHWKHµDXVWHULW\¶UHVSRQVHV represented 
at the bottom of figure 1. They include the benefit cap, changes to benefit up-rating 
mechanisms and levels, and a freeze on all working-age benefits for four years effective from 
April 2016. The up-rating changes in particular represent significant structural change: they 
will reduce the value of benefits relative to wages, and will substantially reduce incomes for 
those who rely on them whether in or out of work. However, they take effect over time, and 
their impact and effect takes time to become apparent (Hills, 2015a). The benefit cap affects a 
much smaller number of households but has been expected to increase relative poverty, 
SDUWLFXODUO\IRUFKLOGUHQ%URZQH&KLOGUHQ¶V6RFLHW\$ further important 
change within  the existing programme structures is the extension of the system of sanctions 
for non-compliance with increasingly onerous requirements for JSA and ESA claimers, now 
denying some ten per cent of them full entitlement for periods of between three months and a 
year (Oakley 2014: 17). 
Even despite this, there LVOLWWOHVRIDUWKDWZRXOGEHHDVLO\FRQVLGHUHGµWKLUGRUGHU¶FKDQJH
UHIUDPLQJWKHSROLF\SDUDGLJPDVXQGHUVWRRGLQ+DOO¶VIUDPHZRUNDV0F.D\DQG
                                                          
1
 The Scotland Act (2016) makes provision to devolve some areas of welfare, including 
welfare-to-work, disability and housing payments, to the Scottish Government. 
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Rowlingson (2011) observe. Rather these seem to be changes to settings or levels (first or 
second order change). Later accounts, focusing more on the outcomes achieved by New 
Labour and the Coalition respectively, tell a somewhat different story. This divergence points 
to the wider limitations of looking for change or continuity by examining policy structures 
alone. 
A particularly clear divergence emerges in looking at the respective governments¶ approaches 
to poverty and redistribution. Although reducing inequality was not the main focus of New 
/DERXU¶VVRFLDOSROLF\Stewart 2007), there was a distinctive focus on both child and 
pensioner poverty. Both had increased markedly under the previous Conservative 
governments, and New Labour set about tackling this using a raft of tax and benefit changes 
(Piachaud and Sutherland 2001). Overall under New Labour, poverty fell, whether measured 
EHIRUHRUDIWHUKRXVLQJFRVWV+LOOV+LOOVFRQVHTXHQWO\VXJJHVWVWKDWDµVWULNLQJ
VXFFHVV¶RI1HZ/DERXU¶VZHOIDUHreform programme was the smoothing of incomes across 
the life cycle, which reflects the prioritisation of child and pensioner poverty (see figure 2) 
(2013: 7). Continuing New Labour policies maintained this pattern after the 2007/8 recession 
(Hills 2015b: 39). 
Figure 2: Percentage of people in low-income households 
Source: DWP 2015a 
(YDOXDWLRQVRIWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VDSSURDFKEDVHGERWKRQFXUUHQWO\DYDLODEOHGDWDDQGPRGHOOLQJ
beyond this, offer a contrast. The 2010 to 2015 period saw changes to benefits that took away 
more income from the bottom half of households , than was gained in increased tax 
allowances (Hills 2015b: 39). Changes to up-rating have also cut the value of benefits in real 
terms. These changes and trends are projected to continue (Hills 2015b: 44), although 
8QLYHUVDO&UHGLWµPD\GHOLYHUPRUHPRQH\WRVRPHSRRUHUKRXVHKROGV¶ if it improves benefit 
uptake (2015b: 5). 
These decisions KDYHWLOWHGSROLF\LQIDYRXURISHQVLRQHUVUHGXFLQJ1HZ/DERXU¶VLQWHU-
generational smoothing effect (Hills 2015a: 5). Cash transfers related to children fell 
significantly under the Coalition after 2010/11, while spending on pensioner benefits 
increased (2015b: 34-35). Increases in child poverty are forecast over the period to 2020 
8 
 
(2015b: 44). The (now deferred) tax credit cuts, benefit freezes and further lowering of the 
benefit cap announced in the July 2015 Budget were projected to reduce the living standards 
of the lowest decile by some four per cent and the next decile by seven per cent (Hood 2015). 
The most recent official statistics (figure 2) show no increase in poverty overall (constant at 
21 per cent of the population after housing costs), but only cover the period up to early 2014 
when inflation was low and before Coalition cutbacks had much effect. Progress on reducing 
child poverty appears to have stalled as a consequence of spending decisions (McGuinness 
2015: 11). 
Prior to the 2015 election, Hills cautioned WKDWµLIIXUWKHU³ZHOIDUHFXWV´EH\RQGWKRVHDOUHDG\
agreed became part of deficit reduction >«@ORVVHVDWWKHERWWRPZRXOGEHLQFUHDVHG¶
(2015b: 8). The policy developments announced in the Emergency Budget (HM Treasury, 
2015a) shortly after the election included further cuts to tax credits, housing, incapacity and 
child benefits, and a lower benefit cap. Moreover, the planned increase in the minimum wage 
(retitled the National Living Wage) will not be sufficient to offset losses experienced by the 
majority of low paid people (Johnson 2015: 3). The tax credit cuts were postponed in the 
Autumn Statement, but significant cuts to entitlements will still take place as part of the shift 
to Universal Credit (HM Treasury 2015b, 35-7; Finch 2016) $WWKHVWDUWRI7KHUHVD0D\¶V
tenure as Conservative leader and Prime Minister, the cuts announced under the previous 
leadership remain in place. 
Looking at outcomes also suggests some evidence of discontinuity in other areas. Welfare-to-
work and activation programmes are widely identified in the analyses above as an area of 
FRQWLQXLW\EHWZHHQ1HZ/DERXUDQGWKH&RDOLWLRQDQGµDFWLYH¶ODERXUPDUNHWSROLFLHVKDYH
been a significant element of UK employment policy since the late 1980s (Conservative Party 
1987). However, analysis of outcomes between New Labour and the Coalition points to one 
potentially interesting divergence: the extension of conditionality as an element of activation, 
and attendant use of sanctions.  
The number of JSA claimants facing a sanction each year more than doubled between 
2008/09 (the last full year of New Labour) and 2013/14. There was also an increasing 
GLVSDULW\EHWZHHQWKHQXPEHUVRIVDQFWLRQVHQIRUFHGµDGYHUVH¶GHFLVLRQVDQGWKRVHQRW
enforced or RYHUWXUQHGµQRQ-DGYHUVH¶GHFLVLRQVILJXUH for this group. Subsequent decline 
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in the number of sanctions largely, but not exclusively, reflects a fall in the claimant count 
(for JSA) and in referrals to the Work Programme (for ESA ± see figure 4) (Webster 2014).  
Figure 3: JSA sanction decisions, 2006 ± 2016 
Figure 4: ESA sanction decisions, 2009 ± 2016 
Source: DWP 2016a 
A focus on policy structures would not readily identify discontinuity in either tax and benefit 
policy, or welfare-to-work: two important areas of the benefit system. Yet in both cases the 
argument has been made ± especially by disability activists in relation to the latter (Benstead 
et al. 2014; Williams-Findlay 2011) ± that significant changes have occurred in the 
implementation and practice of particular benefits and policies, and that this is evident in 
outcomes. The general continuity in policy structures is thus not matched by continuity in 
outcomes. This illustrates the point that analyses focussed on different issues lead to different 
conclusions so far as continuity and discontinuity are concerned. However, it also points to 
where we might look to understand this disjuncture, drawing attention to the details of broad 
policies and the issue of how implementation itself can produce change. 
 
Displacement, layering, drift and conversion: identifying system change between New 
Labour and the Coalition 
In the absence of a definitive rupture in UK welfare policy, our focus must be on what 
Streeck and Thelen identify as incremental change that produces transformative or 
discontinuous results (2005: 9). We focus on four of the five processes of institutional change 
they identify (2005: 19-µGLVSODFHPHQW¶µOD\HULQJ¶µGULIW¶DQGµFRQYHUVLRQ¶. Streeck and 
7KHOHQ¶VILIWKPRGHµH[KDXVWLRQ¶ZKLFKRFFXUVZKHQDSROLF\GLUHFWLRQEHFRPHVLQHIIHFWLYH
and loses all support, is not discussed here since it does not appear relevant to current 
developments in the British system.  
After briefly outlining the main features and mechanisms of each process we go on to 
identify and discuss notable developments associated with each. We consider how these 
examples conform to theoretical types and suggest some extensions and modifications to 
10 
 
6WUHHFNDQG7KHOHQ¶VIUDPHZRUNOur analysis suggests that in the area under discussion, 
displacement, supported by significant elements of layering, has been the dominant modes of 
enacting change. There is some more limited evidence of drift and conversion.  
It is important to note that these are processes rather than discrete moments of change. Many 
of the processes identified are still unfolding.  Further changes and shifts may take place, 
particularly if the surrounding economic and political context also changes. We necessarily 
WDNHZKDW+D\DQG)DUUDOOUHIHUWRDVDQµLPSOHPHQWDWLRQSHUVSHFWLYH¶LQWU\LQJWR
understand the significance of current developments. The full impact of these changes is not 
currently clear and may remain unclear for some years. Changes ± in context, leadership, and, 
of course, government ± is likely to have a significant effect on the process of development 
and may alter it. 
Displacement occurs because institutional frameworks are never entirely coherent or 
uncontested. Less powerful logics may exist residually alongside more dominant strands and 
ways of thinking, and dominant logics may be pushed aside or discredited in favour of these 
DWSDUWLFXODUSRLQWVLQWLPH7KLVFRXOGEHIDFLOLWDWHGE\DQH[WHUQDOVKRFNDOWKRXJKLWµKHOSVLI
HQGRJHQRXVFKDQJHKDVSUHSDUHGWKHJURXQGIRUWKLV¶6WUHHFNDQG7KHOHQ. This is 
because it is difficult for one logic to supplant another if it lacks legitimacy or perceived 
authenticityRULINH\DFWRUVKDYHIDLOHGWRµEX\LQ¶WRLW.  
'LVSODFHPHQWPD\DOVRHQWDLOWKHµUHGLVFRYHU\RUDFWLYDWLRQRISUHYLRXVO\VXSSUHVVHGRU
VXVSHQGHGSRVVLELOLWLHV¶6WUHHFNand Thelen suggest that a representative example 
of this kind of change is the shift from Keynesian to neo-liberal economic logics that 
accelerated under the Thatcher governments in the 1980s (2005: 20). This is understood as 
actively cultivated rather than economically and socially inevitable, as the prevailing political 
narratives of the time may suggest (Hay 2010). Such logics can be viewed as shaping and 
justifying attempts at welfare state retrenchment under the Thatcher governments. Despite a 
broad failure to save cash, these resulted in a significant ideological shift in thinking on 
welfare that subsequently acted as a partial influence on New Labour (Taylor-Gooby 2014). 
Detecting processes of displacement involves examining the ideas underpinning policy 
change within existing policy frameworks. Detail matters here. Just as residual logics exist 
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alongside more dominant ones in wider political thinking, the ideas informing specific 
policies are rarely monolithic, but are likely to reflect the multitude of co-existing logics that 
inform policy structures. Differences are likely to result from the extent to which one logic 
RYHUVKDGRZVDQRWKHU3DUWVRI1HZ/DERXU¶VUHIRUPVZHUHLQIOXHQFHGE\strands of 
Thatcherite thinking. These ideas included an emphasis on supply-side labour market 
strategies, embodied in the New Deals and the increases in conditionality applied to the 
receipt of benefitsGUDZLQJRQWKHLGHDRIUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDWWDFKHGWRWKHµULJKW¶WRUHFHLYH
welfare. This influence also underpinned 1HZ/DERXU¶VKHVLWDQF\LQSURPRWLQJLQFRPH
redistributiRQZLWKWKHFRQVHTXHQFHWKDWµcash transfers from the state (benefits and tax 
credits) were not identified ± rhetorically, at least ± as the central instrument to achieve the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VREMHFWLYHV¶ZLWKUHJDUGWRSRYHUW\+LOOV 
Some of these elements were broadly sustained and accelerated by the Coalition and 
Conservatives. Notably, the Work Programme and various work experience schemes imposed 
a more stringent conditionality regime on claimants, with welfare-to-work accordingly 
identified as an area of considerable continuity in several of the analyses above, and one 
where it is difficult to detect displacement. It is important to note that displacement is only 
one mechanism of change, although it may seem to be the one that exerts the most decisive 
effect. The absence of processes of displacement in the sub-policy area of welfare-to-work 
does not preclude the possibility of other types of change occurring within it, as we return to 
below. Similar, somewhat continuous ideas and logics may still be repurposed to different 
goals and purposes. 
In the areas of policy focused on reducing poverty, there is more evidence of displacement 
occurring between New Labour and the Coalition. New Labour was, as discussed, hesitant to 
place redistribution prominently in characterising its approach to poverty. However, the 
policy instruments deployed in relation to disadvantage addressed relative financial poverty, 
representing an implicit belief that the welfare state could provide an effective means of 
dealing with this problem. 7KHµUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶HPSKDVLVHGE\1HZ/DERXUZHUHWKHUHIRUH
LQSUDFWLFHYHU\PXFKXQGHUSLQQHGE\DµULJKW¶WRVXSSRUW  For example, an integral part of 
1HZ/DERXU¶VVWUDWHJ\ZLWKUHJDUGWRSRYHUW\ZDVWKHWDUJHWLQJRIWD[FUHGLWVWRZDUGV
families, deployed in support of the aim of eliminating child poverty by 2020. Some progress 
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was made towards this goal, but further advances depended on increases in in- and out-of-
work benefits that kept pace with inflation. This was a strategy that endorsed the value of 
spending on welfare. Structurally, parts RIWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VDSSURDFKendorse this. Universal 
&UHGLWIRUH[DPSOHZLOOFRQWLQXHWRµWRSXS¶ORZZDJHVDQGZLOOKDYH a small redistributive 
impact on the poorest families (Brewer, Browne and Joyce 2011: 3).  
However, XQGHUQHDWKWKHEURDGVWUXFWXUHVRIWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VDSSURDFKLWLVSRVVLEOHWRGLVFHUQ
more negative perspectives on welfare spending. Partly this can be explained in relation to 
the identification of the need to reduce public spending as WKHµPRVWXUJHQWWDVN¶IDFLQJWKH
incoming Coalition (HM Government 2010: 7). Indeed, New Labour also proposed cuts to 
spending in 2010 and 2015, responding to the altered economic context. However, the 
&RDOLWLRQ¶VDSSURDFKZDVXQGHUSLQQHGE\DQDUUDWLYHon welfare spending that drew heavily 
RQQDUUDWLYHVRIZHOIDUHDVµZDVWH¶+D\WRQDQG0F(QKLOO; see, for example, Duncan 
Smith 2011b) This is a different logic to that which dominated under New Labour, rendering 
spending on measures such as tax credits to relieve poverty undesirable on a moral as well as 
financial basis. BRWKWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHVDQG/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWVFULWLFL]HG1HZ/DERXU¶V
approach, claiming it focused excessively on income transfers and excluded more holistic 
measurements of poverty (Clegg 2011). The response from the Conservatives in particular 
KDVEHHQSURORQJHGGLVFXVVLRQRIDOWHUQDWLYHPHDVXUHPHQWVFXOPLQDWLQJLQ'XQFDQ6PLWK¶V
2015 announcement of changes to child poverty measurements (DWP 2015b). 
These changes focus less on inequality and more on individual and societal problems. The 
implication is that poverty cannot be addressed without resolving these issues, downgrading 
the importance of income transfer measures (Hayton and McEnhill 2015). Consequentially, 
measures such as changes to up-rating and the benefit cap which will increase relative child 
poverty (Brewer, Browne and Joyce 2011: 25-31; Browne 2012: 23) can be framed as 








the rules of the system. $ORQJVLGHWKLVWKHIRFXVRQZHOIDUHDVµZDVWH¶VHHPVWRLPSO\± 
contra New Labour ± that the goal of morally upstanding citizens should be to move away 
from state support altogether. Displacement is also inferred in policies such as the cap and 
up-rating changes, which frame deservingness not in terms of need but in terms of fulfilment 
of conditions and compliance. For some indiYLGXDOVWKHµULJKW¶WRILQDQFLDOVXSSRUWLV
accordingly reduced, while the responsibility bourn by the state for alleviating poverty is also 
limited. 
7KXVZKLOHVRPHSROLF\HOHPHQWVRI1HZ/DERXU¶VIUDPHZRUNKDYHEHHQPDLQWDLQHGE\WKH
Coalition, displacement is nonetheless in evidence. This has been able to occur in a relatively 
seamless fashion because of the existence of different logics alongside one another 
WKURXJKRXW1HZ/DERXU¶VWLPHLQSRZHUOn the one hand, New Labour recognised the need 
to address relative poverty and saw a role for the state in doing so. On the other, as Blair 
stated, there was a strong YLHZWKDWµULJKWVDQGRSSRUWXQLW\ZLWKRXWUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDUH
HQJLQHVRIVHOILVKQHVVDQGJUHHG¶quoted in Craig and Porter, 1998). Under the Coalition, the 
latter view has been expressed strongly to the detriment of the formerZLWKµULJKWV¶IDUPRUH
FRQGLWLRQDORQIXOILOOLQJµUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶. This translates relatively smoothly to downplaying 
the more egalitarian elements of New Labour¶s approach, and focusing to a greater extent on 
the responsibilities of individuals (Hayton and McEnhill, 2015). 
Indications from the early months of the Conservative government suggest that this process 
will continue and become further embedded in the policies and goals of welfare. For 
example, as the gap between a higher National Living Wage and benefits for those out of 
work widens, the welfare system is likely to play a smaller role in reducing poverty. This 
further reinforces the assumption that financial independence from the state is the primary 
form of social obligation and responsibility, diminishing the role of the state as a provider of 
security. This shift is supported by other changes through layering, drift and conversion. 
Layering is used as a means of effecting change because buy-in to long-existing systems 
renders them costly and difficult to dismantle, both financially and politically. Actors seeking 
to reform such systems have to work around existing elements, and layering can be a means 
of smoothing the transition between systems embodying differing logics and ideas. It 
involves the deliberate promotion of differential growth: a new system is introduced to run on 
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top of an existing one, but is set up in such a way that it will grow faster. In the long run, this 
µFDQHIIHFWSURIRXQGFKDQJH¶6WUHHFNDQG7KHOHQ), as the earlier system is less and 
less used and eventually becomes obsolete. 
/D\HULQJVWUDWHJLHVDUHYLVLEOHLQWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶s austerity-focused reform programme, 
extending further under the Conservatives. The clearest example is in the group of policies 
represented in purple in figure 1. These include, for example, steps to over-lay all benefits 
paid to non-working households layered with the benefit cap, initially £26,000, then cut to 
£23,000 in London and the South East and £20,000 elsewhere. 
There are tensions inherent in introducing such limitations within a system designed to pay 
out amounts that the Government evidently believes are too high. As Robert Joyce of the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies suggests, although such policy measures µPDy well be politically 
H[SHGLHQW>«@for a Government to set a system of benefits which it evidently thinks gives 
some families excessive entLWOHPHQWVDQGWRWKHQDWWHPSWWR³ULJKWWKLVZURQJ´ZLWKDFDS¶
seems incoherent (2012). A more consistent approach might have been to limit overall 
payments: the opportunities offered by the introduction of Universal Credit for such extensive 
change could have been used to better effect in this case.   
However, introducing such sweeping change would be politically and administratively 
challenging at a time when the Coalition was already committed to extensive administrative 
reform. The extra conditionality introduced through layering these policies on top of the 
existing structure can be interpreted therefore a means of reducing the cover provided by the 
system, DQGEXWWUHVVLQJWKHDSSHDOWRµUHVSRQVLEOH¶EHKDYLRXU. It may ultimately contribute to 
shaping expectations of the level of state support available. Such a method of bringing about 
change and shaping expectations is gradual and piecemeal, offering a more risk-averse 
strategy compared with a comprehensive overhaul.  
These policies are vulnerable to being viewed as electoral manoeuvres, more concerned with 
rhetoric than with financial savings (Taylor-Gooby and Taylor 2015), especially as the 
DPRXQWVLQYROYHGDUHVPDOOLQUHODWLRQWRWKH8.¶VVSHQGLQJGHILFLW+07UHDVXU\
2015: 73). They aOVRRIIHUDPHDQVRIUHLQIRUFLQJWKHµGLVSODFHPHQW¶DFWLYLW\RXWOLQHGDERYH
and are consistent with its implied logic in relation to reducing the role and responsibilities of 
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the state in providing financial support, while emphasising the responsibilities of individuals 
and households for their own financial situations.  
However, pROLFLHVVXFKDVµEHGURRPWD[¶GLIIHUVOLJKWO\IURPWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIOD\HULQJ
set out by Streeck and Thelen. The same might also be said of changes to housing benefit via 
DVHULHVRIUHVWULFWLRQVLQFOXGLQJOLPLWDWLRQVIRU\RXQJSHRSOHDQGWKHµEHGURRPWD[¶7KHVH
changes are not designed so much to replace one system with another as they are to gradually 
reduce entitlement to financial support without replacement. Such policy instruments 
conform to the definition of layering, since they run alongside and aim to halt and reverse the 
growth of a range of existing benefits. However the aim appears to be retrenchment, rather 
than the development of state welfare in an alternative direction. This suggests that 
governments may use layering in a slightly different way from that identified by Streeck and 
Thelen. Where retrenchment and reducing expectations of support is a key objective, 
somewhat counter-intuitively, the introduction of new layered policies can also be used to 
scale down existing programmes gradually, rather than scaling across to new, replacement 
systems. 
In contrastWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VDSSURDFKWRZHOIDUH-to-work seems to offer a more conventional 
example of layering/DERXU¶V1HZ'HDOV)OH[LEOH1HZ'HDOVDQG(PSOR\PHQW=RQHV
already incorporated some service provision from the private, voluntary and civil society 
VHFWRUV7KH&RDOLWLRQ¶V:RUN3URJUDPPHH[WHQGed this greatly, enhancing the role of the 
SULYDWHVHFWRULQSDUWLFXODU)LIWHHQRXWRIHLJKWHHQµSULPHFRQWUDFWRUV¶DQGDSSUR[LPDWHO\
three in five subcontractors are private companies. To a lesser extent, the role of the 
voluntary sector is also extended through the Work Programme (McGuinness and Dar 
2014:15). This development and the use of Payment by Results have been presented as 
essential to reducing the costs of welfare-to-work (Freud 2007). In turn this necessarily limits 
the capacity of the public sector to provide such services, while rapidly expanding the role of 
the private sector and somewhat supporting third sector organisations.  
Interestingly, the Conservative majority government currently plans to reduce sharply 
outsourced delivery of welfare to work. The Work and Health Programme will be a 
significantly smaller programme than those it replaces (Work Programme and the specialist 
disability programme, Work Choice: DWP 2016b). The majority of provision for 
16 
 
unemployed people will therefore move back into Jobcentre Plus, delivered via generalist 
µ:RUN&RDFKHV¶. Alongside this, there has been a managed decline in the extent of specialist 
support provided directly by DWP agents (for example, through Disability Employment 
Advisors: HC Deb 27 January 2016, Col 130WH). Such support is increasingly to be 
provided through referrals to external local agencies (DWP 2016c). This may significantly 
enhance the role played by the voluntary sector. This process could provide an early-stage 
illustration of how the gradual removal of layered programmes such as the Work Programme 
contributed to the loss of elements of employment support capacity within the DWP. 
Developments in the 2015 to 2020 parliament in this respect will be of interest, and may 
provide further refinement in understanding how layering is used in slimming down welfare 
state programmes. 
7KHWKLUGDQGIRXUWKW\SHVRIFKDQJHDUHµGULIW¶DQGµFRQYHUVLRQ¶ Drift occurs because 
policies and institutions are not self-sustaining. They require active maintenance and re-
calibration to be able to respond effectively to new risks and challenges. Without this, they 
DUHDWULVNRIEHLQJLQFUHDVLQJO\LUUHOHYDQWDQGVXEMHFWWRµHURVLRQRUDWURSK\¶6WUHHFNDQG
Thelen 2005: 24). Change by drift therefore takes place predominantly through deliberate 
non-action by policy-makers. Institutions become increasingly unfit for purpose, and 
ultimately redundant.  
Conversion is the redirection of existing policy instruments toZDUGVµQHZJRDOVIXQFWLRQVRU
SXUSRVHV¶DVDUHVXOWRIHPHUJLQJFKDOOHQJHVRUSUREOHPV6WUHHFNDQG7KHOHQ,WLV
made possible through the gaps between existing institutional regimes and their enactment. If 
WKHUHLVDSHUIHFWµILW¶EHWZHHQLGHD and implementation, then there is not much space within 
which change can occur. However, implementation often requires policy to satisfy a number 
RIGLIIHUHQWDQGQRWQHFHVVDULO\PXWXDOO\VXSSRUWLYHHQGV$VVXFKLWLVDQLQKHUHQWO\µPHVV\¶
process, potentially leaving considerable space for re-interpretations. 
'ULIWDQGFRQYHUVLRQDUHKDUGHUWRGHWHFWLQWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHZHOIDUHV\VWHPDV
it applies to working age people. However, a significant change in the UK context in recent 
years, related to the developments already discussed, concerns the structure of the labour 
market. The UK has moved towards an increasingly flexible labour market, characterized by 
higher levels of part-time work, self-employment, casualization and short-term contract 
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employment (Jowett et al. 2014). It also has a higher incidence of low paid work than many 
RWKHUGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV6FKPXHFNHU1HZ/DERXU¶VWD[FUHGLWVZHUHSDUWO\
intended to top up low pay. The Coalition built on this through Universal Credit, which aims 
to link the tax and benefit systems. In doing so, it should enable people to take work where 
available (even if only temporarily) without fear of losing too much in benefits, or 
experiencing under and over-payments. This is one of the central aims of the policy (DWP 
2010: 4).  
Universal Credit therefore offers an example of the conversion of policy instruments to shape 
the institutions of the welfare state around work. Faced with a labour market that is 
increasingly characterised by uncerWDLQW\WKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VUHVSRQVHKDVQRWEHHQWRDGGUHVVWKH
demand side (for example, by bolstering employment rights), but to make it easier for 
individuals to work and live with such uncertainty.  
The Coalition also weakened the extent to which such instruments can compensate 
effectively for labour market weaknesses, indicating drift. For example, the cuts in tax credits 
(benefits originally intended to mitigate low wages) prevent them from fulfilling this 
function. The uprating of the National Minimum Wage to a National Living Wage by 2020 
appears insufficient to outweigh the consequent fall in living standards over the period for 
low-income families (Johnson 2015). While the objective of Universal Credit is to provide a 
seamless link between in and out-of-work welfare, appropriate for a more flexible labour 
market, the decision to cut entitlements for those in and out of work contribute to drift in the 
SROLF\¶VDELOLW\WRFRPSHQVDWHIRUORZSD\7KLVUHLQIRUFHVWKHSRLQWWKDWLWLVHVVHQWLDOWR
consider the detail of implementation in order to understand the extent to which reform bears 
on policy outcomes. It also indicates that inequality is likely to become more marked in the 
future, as the direction of policy bears most heavily on the living standards of those on out-
of-work benefits and on low wages. 
4. Conclusion 
6RPHFRPPHQWDWRUVVXJJHVWWKDWWKH&RDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFKWRZHOIDUHSROLF\
represents a significant departure from the New Labour model, indicating that further 
divergence is OLNHO\WREHDIHDWXUHRIWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHJRYHUQPHQW¶VWHQXUH2thers 
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detect much greater elements RIFRQWLQXLW\7KH8.¶VDGYHUVDULDOSROLWLFDOV\VWHPHQFRXUDJHV
politicians to exaggerate party differences; yet regardless of whether one ultimately perceives 
change or continuity, it is often difficult to reconcile the promises of change during election 
campaigns with overall structures of policy after the dust has settled.  
Those who point to continuity tend to emphasize similarities in policy structures, instruments 
and ideas. Stabilising elements include the civil service, public opinion, and the sheer 
complexity of policy. Those who stress divergence place greater importance on policy 
outcomes. A central challenge is whether these two different perspectives can be synthesized. 
This paper has suggested that a focus on change as a process can prove illuminating in this 
respect, aiding our understanding of how non-disruptive change can lead to significantly 
divergent outcomes. The utility of the model that we have used in this paper is therefore as a 
means of reconciling two divergent accounts of the same period, illustrating the potentially 
transformative capacity of non-radical change. 
We see significant outcome changes in terms of benefit strategy, with the Coalition and 
Conservative approach focusing on reducing and increasingly targeting benefits on retired 
people and those in paid work. This has the effect of increasing inequality, and the divisions 
between those in and out of work. This has been achieved through a large number of iterative 
changes to benefit uprating, entitlement and level. Individually, these are not of 
transformative importance, but they culminate in significant inequalities. Around welfare-to-
work policy there has also been a significant reduction in state capacity and infrastructure, 
resulting in a more minimal welfare state apparatus. Thus while there are real similarities in 
policy frameworks, outcomes differ and the object of the welfare state has shifted from the 
mitigation of inequalities and the meeting of needs among unemployed groups in particular, 
to the embedding of a morality of paid work and individual responsibility.  
Despite similarities in policy approaches (a stress on activation, with each party portraying 
the others as the patrons of µwelfare dependency¶KRZHYHUGHILQHG; an emphasis on the 
importance of constraining state expenditure; a shift towards much greater use of non-state 
bodies as agents in policy delivery; attempts to mobilize disabled people into paid work and 
cut spending on disability benefits; greater targeting of rent benefits and the reduction of the 
housing benefit budget; a benefits cap; implementation of a minimum wage at a fairly low 
19 
 
level together with supplementation of low wages) the differences in outcomes are sufficient 
to justify the claim that welfare state policy began moving in a new direction under the 
Coalition, and latterly under the Conservatives.  
We go on to suggest that approaches to policy change which seek to identify first, second and 
third order changes and do so by differentiating between adjustments to existing policy 
instruments, the introduction of new instruments and wholesale redirection of the policy 
paradigm may suffer from weaknesses in the present context. Most changes are first order 
and some second order. However, these changes add up to a third order redirection of policy 
EHFDXVHWKH\OHDGZHOIDUHSROLF\WRZDUGVGLIIHUHQWRXWFRPHVLQHTXDOLW\EHWZHHQµLQVLGHUV¶
UHWLUHGRULQZRUNDQGXQHPSOR\HGµRXWVLGHUV¶, versus income smoothing across the life-
cycle.   
We use Streeck anG7KHOHQ¶VµEH\RQGFRQWLQXLW\¶DSSURDFKWRDQDO\VHWKHVHFKDQJHVSD\LQJ
particular attention to the displacement of existing policy logics and the layering of policy 
instruments to achieve change over time. It is, of course, comparatively early to be assessing 
the full extent of change enacted by the Coalition. We do not offer a definitive account. 
However, we suggest that the underlying logics are sufficiently altered that the welfare state 
in Britain is moving along a new trajectory, underpinned by mechanisms that are 
cumulatively capable of producing transformation. Attention to both the structure and process 
of change, and the overall impact, is therefore necessary to capture the full extent of current 
VKLIWVLQWKH%ULWLVKZHOIDUHVWDWHIURPµ7KLUG:D\¶DFWLYDWLRQWRWKHPRUDOLW\RISDLGZRUNDV
the only legitimate basis for income.  
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